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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: A Study on the Legal Status and Responsibilities of Master
in Autonomous Vessels: the case of general remote operators
Degree:

Master of Science

This study aims to examine the master of MASS, which is emerging along with the
development of MASS technology. In particular, this author paid attention to whether
the master's responsibilities can be assigned to the MASS remote operator of MASS
autonomy degree 2 & 3. For this study, this author reviewed the relevant IMO
Committees and Working Group discussions and the relevant dissertations, articles,
and documents.
This study affirmed that it is difficult to assign roles and responsibilities to the MASS
remote operator like the master of a conventional ship. This is because the MASS
remote operator functions only as a human element performing navigation operations
in the entire MASS operating system environment. Since the MASS remote operator
acts similarly to the watchkeeping officer of the ship's bridge, it can be regarded as a
seafarer. However, MASS remote operator is not a seafarer subject to the STCW
Convention because they do not work on board a ship. Therefore, it is necessary to
prepare new competence and training requirements suitable for the role.
This author emphasized in particular that the IMO and the international community
should be cautious about granting the status of master to the MASS remote operator.
The first imperative is to find a way to distribute the roles and responsibilities of the
conventional master in the MASS operating system. The best method would be to
systematically enact a new MASS Code to solve these problems and foster the MASS
technology.
This author draws up several suggestions to find a solution. These include a definition
of MASS remote operator, the direction of job description guidelines, training and
competence requirements, protection of legal responsibility, and certification of
MASS operation area.

MASS, Remote Operator, Remote Control Centre, MASS Code,
Responsibilities of Master, Control rights, Competence of MASS Remote Operator
KEYWORDS:
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The global 4th industrial revolution technology is affecting the overall industry. In the
maritime industry, from 2022 to 2030, the autonomous ships market is projected to
grow at an annual rate of 13% (“Autonomous Ships Market”, n.d.), and it is estimated
to reach $10.1 billion by 2026 (“Global Autonomous Ships”, 2022). Currently, MASS
development and test operations are taking place in Europe actively. In addition, major
shipbuilding countries such as the Republic of Korea, China and Japan are also
concentrating on developing MASS to preoccupy the future shipbuilding industry. The
emergence of MASS is expected to affect the overall shipping logistics, maritime
safety, and marine environment fields. It is known that shipping and logistics
efficiency is expected to improve to 10% and maritime accidents to decrease to 75%
(MOF, 2021). Furthermore, it is also anticipated that the labor cost required for ship
operation human resources will be reduced by 20%, and the related ship equipment
industry will be vitalized ("The era of autonomous ship", 2022). Due to the high level
of safety and efficient economic feasibility of MASS, the international demand for
MASS to shipping companies is expected to increase in the future. According to the
study report of WMU, Transport 2040, the future of work 11% to 17% of the world's
fleets will be autonomously supervised by humans (WMU, 2019). These prospects
accelerate technology development and competition for stakeholders such as
governments, shipyards, marine equipment companies, research institutes, and
shipping companies worldwide to preoccupy autonomous ship technology. The
emergence of MASS is expected to materialize in any form soon, depending on the
fulfillment of several factors such as the legal framework, technology feasibility,
economic benefit, and social acceptance (Fonseca et al., 2021).

However, the emergence of a new type of MASS that is different from the existing
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operating vessel type is expected to bring institutional and legal issues. What should
be considered above all else is the issue of who is given the responsibility and authority
of the master in terms of the operation of the MASS. As a temporary measure, the
maritime administration may be able to implement a method that somewhat relieves
legal requirements in the process of developing MASS technology such as suspending
the minimum safe manning requirement necessary for ship operation. However, when
the time comes for ships to operate in earnest, temporary measures are not enough and
a legal system needs to be prepared consequently.

1.2 Problem Statement
IMO 99th Maritime Safety Committee classified MASS to be operated in four stages.
This is classified into degree one, which controls the on-board system by a crew
member; degree two, which remotely controls the vessel on which the crew is boarded;
degree three, which is a remote-controlled vessel without a crew; and degree four,
which is a fully autonomous ship type (IMO, 2018a). In line with these discussions
and technology development, it is necessary to discuss and study how and to whom
the role of the existing master will be distributed at each stage of the MASS operation
type.

1.3 Aims and/or objectives
The purpose of this study is to examine the roles and responsibilities of the MASS
master and the scope of responsibility of the remote operator. Based on this
examination, it is intended to suggest solutions necessary for ongoing and future
discussions on IMO, enactment of MASS Code, establishing national policies, and
promoting MASS development accordingly.

For this purpose, the following objectives are studied:
1) Review the rules related to MASS identified by the IMO Regulatory Scoping
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Exercise (RES);
2) Review of traditional master's responsibilities based on IMO international
regulation;
3) Review of the legal status and responsibilities of the MASS master and remote
operator;
4) Study and review case studies and precedents for autonomous land vehicles; and
5) Suggest solutions and recommendations for adopting MASS technology.

1.4 Research questions and/or hypotheses
The following research questions will be answered during this research study:
1) How can the role and responsibilities of the MASS master be divided by situation
and function?
2) Is the MASS remote operator the master? If so, what status do they have?
3) What legal measures and solutions should be prepared for a uniform MASS remote
operator worldwide?

To answer the first question, this study will examine the relationship between the
master's presence and obligation on the ship's bridge in the IMO Conventions and
some national regulations. This relates to the obligation of the master to present the
ship's bridge. For the second question, this study will attempt to seek an answer to
whether it is possible to assign the MASS remote operator the functional role of the
master, who is in charge of the operation of the ship and the owner's agent. For the
third question, the master's legal responsibility given in the international conventions
will be examined, especially the IMO instruments such as STCW and SOLAS, and
how to prepare the legal framework for the operation of MASS. This study is not
covered in terms of International Maritime Commercial law. In the context of
Maritime Commercial Law, the master is the ship owner's representative and an
assistant in fulfillment of the contract of carriage. In addition, in relation to illegal acts,
the master becomes an employee of the ship owner (Kim, 2022). The issue of whether
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these responsibilities under the maritime law can be assigned to the MASS remote
operator is mainly focused on the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, such as ship charter
contracts, bill of lading (B/L), seaworthiness, error of navigation, and cargo claims.
Since the elements should be looked at closely, it is appropriate to deal with them
through a separate study rather than discussing them in this study.

1.5 Methodology research design and methods
In order to carry out this study, the IMO committee, European and significant
countries' technology development, and legislation cases are studied. In addition, a
literature review, IMO documents, books, peer-reviewed articles, and various
publications are investigated. In addition, the author also examines the application of
laws and precedents for autonomous vehicles on land, where technological discussions
are taking place, and also reviews whether they can be applied to MASS.

1.6 Key assumptions and potential limitations
The emergence of MASS is based on the development of technologies such as the
improvement of shipbuilding capability, autonomous decision-making system,
artificial intelligence, information and communication system, remote control system,
automatic route control and automatic navigation system (Kim et al., 2018, as cited in
Chun et al., 2021). According to the current MASS technology development trend, the
development of MASS differs for each development institution and project, but it
suggests the stages of automation of the process, support for decision support on shore,
and the development of a fully autonomous ship with remote control (KISTEP, 2019).
With the introduction of MASS, maritime technology is expected to change
significantly in three areas: i) ship structure and design, ii) autonomous navigation and
control technology and iii) ship maintenance and repair (KISTEP, 2019). In detail, the
structure of the ship is a closed structure, the bridge and living area are minimized, and
the design is expected to consider the electric propulsion system and low noise.
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Autonomous navigation and control technology requires situational awareness and
judgment, autonomous navigation technology using artificial intelligence, shore
remote control and steering technology in case of emergency, and big data-based
operation in consideration of weather, route conditions, and fuel consumption. It was
found that ship maintenance and repair require remote self-diagnosis and inspection
technology, and unmanned maintenance using robots or drones (KISTEP, 2019).
However, MASS technology development and discussion are ongoing worldwide, but
due to implementation technology and legal regulations, the appearance of MASS
degree 4, a fully autonomous ship, is not expected to be completed in a short time
(Park, 2019). Considering the stage and trend of MASS technology development,
MASS degree 2 and degree 3 ships operated with remote operators are gradually
appearing in the maritime field or aiming to develop within a few years before fully
autonomous degree 4 ships appear immediately. Therefore, it is more urgent than
anything else to clearly establish the legal responsibilities and scope of such remote
operators. MASS is a significant challenge to the existing legal system centered on
seafarers, and it requires a new transformation in social systems and physical
infrastructure linked to the maritime legal system (Lee et. al., 2018). With this
background, this study will focus on degree two and three types of MASS. In the case
of degree four, which is fully MASS, it is possible to obtain the master's competence
as a MASS system itself. In such cases, it is necessary to consider giving the MASS
system a legal personification. This is an area where more research is needed to
provide products the master's status and hold them accountable. This study may cover
some of these issues, but first, the author focuses more on the case of remote operators
and review them.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
IMO defined MASS as "a ship which, to a varying degree, can operate independently
of human interaction" (IMO, 2018a). Ramboll-Core defines MASS as a ship capable
of automatically operating a ship or from somewhere else that supports decisionmaking or partially or entirely replaces human control (Ramboll et. al., 2017).

Since the current IMO SOLAS and STCW Conventions are based on the physical
embarkation of the master and crew, there is an argument that a new convention needs
to be adopted or revised (Vojković et al., 2020). Even if remote operators take over
the master's role, their functions are limited to land-based (Baughen, 2019). There is
also a study arguing that it is reasonable to give remote operators the status of ‘land
remote navigation masters and seafarers’ and that the necessary qualifications,
education, and training systems need to be established (Choi et al., 2018). As the role
of the remote operator in MASS replaces the existing master's qualifications and
experience, there is also a study claiming that it is necessary to establish a
responsibility system accordingly (Jeon, 2018). In addition, there is a study that
identified the risks of MASS into four stages: navigation planning, entry and departure,
port approach, and high sea navigation, and analyzed safety and risk (Fan et al., 2020).

Meanwhile, some countries already preemptively recognize a MASS remote operator
as a master. The UK is to introduce the concept of MASS to discussions to amend the
Merchant Shipping Act (UK, 2021). According to the amendment, the MASS master
is a person in charge and command, except for the pilot, who has the ultimate role and
responsibility regardless of whether the ship is on board, and the remote operator is
defined as a person who performs remote work of MASS including the MASS master.
In other words, it is specified that the master does not necessarily board a ship and the
physical presence of the master is not considered in the definition.
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Chapter 3 MASS technology development and legal discussion
trend
3.1 MASS technology development status
For the technology development of MASS, multinational research and development
projects are in progress all over the world. Among them, European shipping
powerhouses and Asian shipbuilding powerhouses are expected to grow into large
markets for MASS ("Recent trends", 2021). In this study, the author will examine the
MASS technology development trend, which is being conducted mainly in Europe and
Asia.

3.1.1 Europe
The EU carried out the MUNIN (Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence
in Network) project for about three years from 2012 to 2015, with a total budget of 3.8
million EUR. In this project, organizations from Germany, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
and Ireland jointly participated to develop technology for operating an unmanned
cargo ship and presented a framework with a remote operator as a fundamental concept
(MUNIN, 2016).

Based on the MUNIN project, the European Union is implementing the AEGIS project
with an investment of 7.5 million EUR over three years from June 2020 to May 2023.
It is composed of 12 partners including Norway, Denmark, Finland and Germany, and
develops a small feeder ship capable of autonomous navigation to Norway as its home
port and builds a cargo automation system in Aalborg, Denmark (EU CORDIS, n.d).

In Norway, Yara International, jointly with Kongsberg, developed an autonomous ship
that operates offshore and succeeded in operation in November 2021. The name of the
vessel is Yara Birkeland, a 120 TEU container ship, equipped with a ship control
system and shore-based monitoring and operation centre. The vessel is planned to be
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fully operational in 2022 (YARA, 2021).

Meanwhile, a successful area where remote autonomous navigation has been
demonstrated in Europe is the ferry (Wright, 2020). In 2018, Folgefonn in Norway
demonstrated autonomous docking after sailing to a port of call with autonomous
navigation. In 2018, Finferries' car ferry Falco sailed between Parainen and Nauvo
performed autonomous navigation and remote control, and operated object detection,
collision avoidance, and automatic docking through artificial intelligence and sensor
fusion. Also, in 2018, Finland's Helsinki City Transport succeeded in remote control
of Suomenlinna II (Wright, 2020).

3.1.2 Japan
Japan's NYK (Nippon Yusen Kaisha) Line is developing an autonomous ship with the
goal of completion in 2025 through its affiliated research institute. In addition, Mitsui
OSK Lines announced that it has succeeded in the world's first unmanned container
ship operation test. The vessel sailed along a pre-established route without having a
crew on board, and also the ship could berth on its own (“First voyage”, 2022).

3.1.3 China
Through the “Made in China 2025” industrial policy, China has designated and is
developing the technology, solution, and control system required for MASS as element
technology. Meanwhile, Zhi Fei, an autonomous ship with a 300TEU scale, is said to
be operating on a short-distance route near Qingdao from October 2021 (“China's first”,
2021).

3.1.4 Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea is in the process of developing the MASS system led by the
government by investing about 133 million USD from 2020 to 2025. Although it is a
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latecomer compared to Europe and other countries, Korea aims to develop a ship with
IMO autonomous degree three by utilizing the strengths of the shipbuilding industry
(KASS, n.d). In addition, development is being actively carried out at the private level.
Recently, it has been announced that it has successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean by
mounting MASS degree 2 technology on an LNG vessel (“LNG Carrier”, 2022). The
test vessel autonomously operated 10,000 km (350 hours) out of a total operating
distance of 20,000 km, capturing the location of other vessels and avoiding collisions
about 100 times (“Hyundai Heavy”, 2022). Also, by operating an autonomously
optimal route through the test, fuel efficiency was increased by 7% and greenhouse
gas emissions were reduced by 5%, and it is estimated that marine accidents can be
reduced by more than 70% when MASS technology is realized in the future (KBS, 22
June 2022).

3.2 Legal discussion on MASS
MASS is gradually preparing for commercialization along with technology
development, but the legal regulations and international legal status of MASS are not
yet clearly identified (Chun et. at., 2021). The international conventions that the
international community should consider when operating MASS in the future include
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the IMO
Conventions that govern the safety and environment of ships. From the UNCLOS
point of view, the legal issues related to MASS are related to the three jurisdictions of
the state guaranteed by UNCLOS: flag state jurisdiction, coast state jurisdiction, and
port state jurisdiction. If each state interprets the UNCLOS jurisdiction of MASS
differently, there is also a concern that potentially inter-state conflict or diplomatic
disputes may arise (Lee et al., 2018). Since ships were controlled and regulated by the
flag State, the jurisdiction that should be considered first in UNCLOS is flag state
jurisdiction. According to UNCLOS Article 94 paragraph 1, "Every State shall
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social
matters over ships flying its flag." This paragraph stipulates jurisdiction for ships in
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the flag State and should be applied to MASS operation. Specifically, the flag State
defines that ships have seaworthiness of ships; the management of ships, labour
conditions and the training of ships; and the prevention of collisions in accordance
with UNCLOS Article 94 paragraph 3. In other words, MASS shall have the technical
seaworthiness including ship inspection, communication facilities and collision
prevention measures and the human seaworthiness of master and crew in accordance
with UNCLOS Article 94 (Lee et al., 2018). If the MASS remote control centre is not
located in the flag State of the corresponding ship but is located in another flag State,
there may be a controversy as to whether the jurisdiction of the flag State is valid
(Logchem, 2022). The interpretation of the flag State as well as the interpretation of
the coastal State and port State should be clearly organized before the introduction of
MASS. However, this study intends to deal with the legal responsibility of the MASS
remote operator, not the jurisdiction aspect of MASS, so this study will focus on IMO
instruments such as SOLAS and STCW.

3.2.1 Definition of MASS
Before working out the legal discussion trend regarding MASS, it is necessary to first
check the definition and classification of MASS. The term MASS was first used at the
MSC 98th session held in 2017 (IMO, 2018b). The definition of MASS is "as a ship
which, to a varying degree, can operate independently of human interaction" for RSE
work (IMO, 2018c), but may be changed later through discussion of the IMO Working
Group. Regarding the classification of MASS by degree, IMO accepted the proposal
of the Danish government in 2019 and classified it into four degrees.
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Table 1
IMO MASS autonomy degree (KISTEP, 2019; presented by author)
Scale

Degree

Description

1

Degree One

A ship with an automated process and decision support
system. Some functions are possible with automation, but
most of the functions are controlled by seafarers on board.

2

Degree Two

A ship is being remotely controlled from another location,
but the crew is on board a ship.

3

Degree Three

A ship without a crew can be remotely controlled from
another location.

Degree Four

A ship capable of fully autonomous operation and is a ship
capable of autonomous operation decisions and actions
through the vessel operating system.

4

Meanwhile, each Classification Society classifies the MASS grade differently from
the 4th to the 7th levels up to the final stage, full autonomy. The American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) is level 6. France's Bureau Veritas (BV) is level 5. Norway's Det
Norske Veritas (DNV) is level 5. The UK's Lloyd's Register (LR) is level 7. Japan's
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NK) is classified into four levels, and the Korean Register KR
is classified into five levels (Lee et al., 2021). The classification of MASS into levels
can be said to be a classification method according to the degree of satisfaction with
complete autonomy. It should be noted here that MASS is an object that focuses on
the system rather than the object of a ship (Lee et al., 2021). The term automation also
refers to the use of automatic equipment in a system process or process that enables a
ship to move from point A to point B (Wright, 2020). LR, the British classification
society, also describes the code that applies the design of MASS as “Design Code for
Unmanned Marine Systems” as a system rather than a ship (LR, 2017). This is because
it is a convergence system in which a person or a system selects ship control rights
such as manual operation, remote operation, and autonomous operation according to
the operating situation (Lee et al., 2021). In terms of the system of MASS, from degree
2, the system takes over the duties of the existing crew, and eight functions are required
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to implement MASS. That is a reliable system for identifying targets or hazards; a
reliable system for identifying targets and controlling ships; proven software and
algorithms; a reliable communication system between MASS and shore-based remote
control station; a reliable and appropriate communication system between the MASS
operator and crew; a reliable communication system with MASS operators and other
stakeholders; appropriate Human Machine Interface; and MASS operation-related
IMO regulations need to be prepared (Chae, 2020). As such, MASS forms a system
based on reliable technology. Therefore, human factors such as the MASS remote
operator can be viewed as a component of the MASS system, not as a crew member
or master.

3.2.2 Progress of IMO’s discussion on MASS
In preparation for the emergence of MASS, the international community together with
IMO examines legal issues that may arise in related tasks such as maritime safety,
seafarer’s policy, and maritime accident investigation in advance, and draws its
implications.

IMO has been implementing the MASS Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) since
2018 in accordance with the adoption to introduce MASS. This is to identify factors
impeding the operation of MASS by examining whether the currently applied
international conventions of IMO are applicable to MASS. The MSC-related
Conventions reviewed by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) as high-priority
in RSE work are as follows: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) chapters II-1, II-2, III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, XI-1 and XI-2; Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG); the
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers (STCW) Convention and Code; the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel
Convention (STCW-F); 1966 the International Convention on Load Lines (LL) and
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1988 Protocol thereto; 1979 the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue (SAR); the International Code for Fire Safety System (FSS Code); the
International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC Code); the International
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code); the International Convention on
Tonnage Measurement of Ships (TONNAGE 1969); the International Code for the
Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC
Code); and the International Code of the Construction and Equipment of Ships
Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code) (IMO, 2021a). In addition, the IMO
Legal Committee also reviewed the following conventions as its authority. They are
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage
(Bunkers 2001), the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (CLC 1969), the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), the
Convention relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material (NUCLEAR 1971), the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (PAL 1974), the Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988), the Nairobi
International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (NAIROBI), the International
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS) (IMO, 2021b).
Through this work, RSE distinguished whether it was necessary to interpret the
provisions of the existing convention and whether to create a new code for the
application of MASS (IMO MSC 103/LEG 108, 2021). Finally, MSC 104th, held in
October 2021, adopted “Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime
autonomous surface ships (MASS)” as a new output for MASS Code development,
and continued work with the goal of completion in 2025. (IMO, 2021a). After that,
MSC 105th in 2022 started developing a non-mandatory goal-based MASS Code,
expecting a mandatory MASS Code to come into effect in 2018. It should be noted
that this includes advice on the definition of MASS and amendment of degrees of
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autonomy as well as high-priority items of common gaps and themes include advice
on the meaning of the terms of master and remote operator as a seafarer (IMO, 2022).
The first meeting of the IMO MSC-LEG-FAL joint working group (JWG) on MASS
was held in September 2022. At this meeting, the JWG listed definitions regarding the
role of MASS master/crew, responsibilities of MASS master/crew, requirements for
remote control station/centre, and responsibilities of the remote operator in the table.
The JWG agreed to collect opinions preferred by Member States and international
organizations for the next meeting. (IMO, 2022b).

Chapter 4 Role of master and its responsibilities
4.1 Overview of legal status and responsibilities of the conventional ship
master
The master acts as the ship owner's agent while also acting as the shipper's legal
representative. The master refers to a person who, as an employee of a shipowner or
charterer, is in charge of the voyage of a specific vessel and has all the statutory
authority on the voyage as an agent (Rha et al., 2004). The master has the public law
position to exercise command and supervision to protect the life and property of the
vessel at the sea where it is always exposed to danger, and has the judicial position to
exercise the power of representation as an agent of the shipowner or charterer (Rha et
al., 2004). As the shipowner's agent, the master has the authority to sign rescue
contracts or legal affairs, and can terminate contracts on maritime-navigation tasks
(Vojković et al., 2020). In other words, legally, as the position of the master in charge
of the operation, public laws such as STCW (Seafarers' Act) are applied, whereas the
provisions of the maritime commercial law are applied as the position of the
shipowner's agent (Park, 2006). Traditionally, the master is responsible for the safety
of the ship, crew and cargo, maintaining seaworthiness, and sometimes also serves as
a public officer, registrar, or public notary (Vojković et al., 2020).
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In practice, the master manages the safe navigation and operation of the vessel.
Maintain the seaworthiness of the ship, carry out duties such as loading and
discharging cargo, ship inspection, entering and leaving ports, and responding to ship
accidents, if they occurred, and take responsibility. It also manages the personnel and
labor of crew members on board. However, the role of the master needs to be changed
and re-established with the advent of MASS. Over the past decades, with the
introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the international
maritime sector experienced that the duties and responsibilities of the master at sea
were transferred to the company on shore. This was the effect of the new convention
and regulation. Likewise, with the advent of MASS, a product of new technology, it
is expected that the existing master's legal responsibilities and duties will be shifted to
the shore. In this chapter, the responsibilities and roles given to the master, focusing
on the master's presence and functionality will be examined.

4.1.1 Master’s presence
The master has the authority to command the ship, but also has duties to safely
complete the voyage while maintaining the safety of the ship. Among these, the duty
of the master is particularly relevant to the MASS remote operator. STCW Convention
Article III stipulates that “The Convention shall apply to seafarers serving on board
seagoing ships entitled to fly the flag of a Party except to those serving on board”,
which means that boarding a ship is a prerequisite for seafarer and master.
According to STCW Convention Chapter VIII Regulation VIII/2 2, “the master of
every ship to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a
safe watch or watches, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and conditions
and that, under the master's general direction”. In other words, it states that the master
is responsible for the watchkeeping arrangements of the vessel. In addition, according
to STCW Convention Chapter VIII Regulation VIII/2 2.1, “officers in charge of the
navigational watch are responsible for navigating the ship safely during their periods
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of duty, when they shall be physically present on the navigating bridge or in a directly
associated location such as the chartroom or bridge control room at all times”. This
emphasizes that the deck officer on the watch must be physically located on the bridge
under the supervision of the master and the watchkeeping guidelines. The STCW
regulations include the bridge area as a chartroom or bridge control room. This can be
said to indicate that the scope of the ship's bridge is a place where navigational
instruments are provided and where a navigational watch can be properly performed
during a voyage.
In addition, according to STCW Code A Regulation Vlll/2 paragraph 10, “the officers
of the navigational watch are responsible for navigating the ship safely during their
periods of duty”. Paragraph 24 of the same regulation stipulates “The officer in charge
of the navigational watch shall keep the watch on the bridge” and “in no circumstances
leave the bridge until properly relieved”. That is, the deck officer of the watch must
stay on the bridge continuously and must not leave the bridge area while on the watch.
This rule applies similarly to the officer in charge of the engineering watch. As defined
in these STCW Conventions, on the bridge of the vessel, an officer of the watch (OOW)
is assigned by the master to maneuver the ship according to the planned voyage
schedule. That is, the master's duty of presence means the duty of the master to be able
to operate the vessel immediately on the bridge all the time during the voyage.
However, it is necessary to redefine the definition as there is a possibility that this duty
of existence may need to be changed according to the stage of MASS.

4.1.2 Master’s functionality
The Master is functionally the shipowner's and the ship's representative, controls the
vessel and has authority over the vessel's navigation and orders (IMO, 2018e). The
IMO conventions and individual contracting governments stipulate the functional
roles, duties and responsibilities of master. STCW Convention A-II/2 specifies that
“the master has ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship, its
passengers, crew and cargo, and for the protection of the marine environment against
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pollution by the ship”. Accordingly, the master must have the competencies and
essential requirements to comply with these responsibilities according to the
regulations. In addition, according to STCW Convention A-II/2 Table A-II/2, the
master is at the manager level of ship navigation, plan a voyage and conduct navigation;
determine position and the accuracy of resultant position fix by any means; determine
and allow for compass errors; coordinate search and rescue operations; establish
watchkeeping arrangements and procedures; maintain safe navigation through the use
of information from navigation equipment and systems to assist command decision
making; maintain the safety of navigation through the use of Electronic Chart Display
and Information System (ECDIS) and associated navigation systems to assist
command decision making; forecast weather and oceanographic conditions; respond
to navigational emergencies; manoeuvre and handle a ship in all conditions; and
operate remote controls of propulsion plant and engineering systems and services.
SOLAS Convention Chapter V Regulation 34 stipulates that “the master shall ensure
that the intended voyage has been planned using the appropriate nautical charts and
nautical publications for the area concerned, taking into account the guidelines and
recommendations developed by the Organization”. In addition, the master stipulates
that ships' routeing systems, safe passage of the ship, navigational hazards and adverse
weather conditions, and marine environmental protection measures should be
considered in establishing a voyage plan. Meanwhile, in paragraph 3 of the same
regulation, the master's decision is based on professional judgment, and the authority
is guaranteed so that no one can be involved. In addition, the rules regarding the
master's responsibility and authority are specified in Chapter 5 of the ISM Code. In
other words, the company must clearly define and document the responsibilities and
authority of the master, including the implementation of the company's safety and
environmental-protection policy and giving appropriate orders and instructions to the
crew.

The Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL) stipulates that
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the master of the ship prepares the ship's documents and submits them to the port
authorities when the ship enters and departs. The relevant basic documents are the
General Declaration, Cargo Declaration, Ship's Stores Declaration, Crew's Effects
Declaration, Crew List, Passenger List, Dangerous Goods Manifest, The document
required under the Universal Postal Convention for mail, Maritime Declaration of
Health, Security-related information as required under SOLAS regulation XI-2/9.2.2,
Advanced electronic cargo information for customs risk assessment purposes, and
Advanced Notification From for Waste Delivery to Port Reception Facilities. The
purpose of this is to promote efficient shipping through the smooth entry and departure
procedures for ships, so it can be said that it is different from directly controlling and
operating a ship.

In addition to the IMO Conventions, it is necessary to examine how the master's
responsibilities and duties are defined in national legislation. In the case of Germany,
paragraph 2 of the Maritime Labor Act Section 5 “Masters and deputies” stipulates
“The master must hold a state certificate of competency which entitles him/her to
command the ship” (BMAS, 2013). In addition, the same Act Chapter 1 “Observance
of order on board” Section 121 “Responsibility of the master for maintaining safety
and order” paragraph 2 states “The master shall maintain public safety and order on
board and in connection with the operation of the ship,” and the master’s decision is
guaranteed to be “may not be prevented by the shipowner” (BMAS, 2013). On the
other hand, in the case of the Republic of Korea, the responsibilities and duties of the
master are more specifically specified depending on the circumstances. First, in the
definition of master (captain) in Seafarer's Act article 2 paragraph 3, "a seafarer who
directs and supervises seamen and takes the responsibility for the operation and
management of a ship" is stipulated. The authority of master can be found in article 6
(Rights to Command and Order), article 22 (Disciplinary Action against Seamen),
article 23 (Measures against Dangerous Articles, etc.) and article 24 (Requesting
Administrative Agency to Aid). Since such master's authority is given according to the
law, it can be said that it is totally independent and gives strong authority to maintain
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the safety of the ship (KSMF, 2021). Meanwhile, the master's obligations under the
Seafarer's Act are article 7 (Responsibilities for Inspection and Reporting before
Departure from Port, etc.), article 8 (Voyage along Sea Route), article 9 (Direct
Command of Captain), article 10 (Duty) to Stay in Ship), article 11 (Measures to Be
Taken When Ship Is in Danger), article 12 (Measures to Be Taken in Case of Collision
of Ships), article 13 (Rescue of Wrecked Ships), article 14 (Notification of Abnormal)
Weather Conditions, etc.), article 15 (Emergency Organization Chart, Drills, etc.), and
article 16 (Ensuring Safety of Sailing) are prescribed. The performance of the master's
authority and responsibility is based on the master's professional judgment, and in
Maritime Safety Act article 45, "No person shall interfere with or intervene in a
shipmaster's expert judgment for the safety of the vessel" is stipulated. This is a
regulation that adapts the SOLAS Convention Chapter V Regulation 34 paragraph 3
to domestic law.

However, in the MASS operation system, these existing functional duties of the master
can be divided into a new job description system based on shore-based support. It is
so-called a kind of group operation system according to the MASS operation system,
and the authority and duties of the master are distributed according to each system and
work system, so that it can be operated more efficiently. In other words, with the
master's knowledge and ability to apply ship personnel management, training, and
effective resource management, these factors can be distributed to the MASS operating
system and shore-based human operators (Kim et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the leadership
and managerial skills for the management and operation of the master ship required
by the current STCW Code Part A-II/2 were found to be irrelevant and insignificant
in MASS operation (Kim et al., 2020). As anticipated, the master's function in the ship
can be expected to be differentiated by each occupational part. In particular, the MASS
remote operator will be in charge of the ship's maneuvering function, and this is only
a part of the entire MASS operation system.
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4.2 Status and responsibilities of each MASS Stage
Since the master does not board the MASS except for one of the four degrees of
automation of the MASS, it is necessary to clarify the role and responsibility of the
master. This soon leads to the question of how to define and give responsibility to
MASS remote operators working at MASS degree 2 and degree 3. Until now, the
majority of opinions believe that, in the case of degree 1 & 2, where seafarers are on
board, existing international conventions and regulations can be applied as it is or
through a unified interpretation (Kim, 2022; Jeon, 2022; Kim, 2019). Meanwhile, in
the case of MASS degree 2, there is an opinion that the ship owner should decide who
is given the status of the master because the remote operator on land and the crew of
the ship work together (Kim, 2019).

However, in the case of degree 2 with the MASS remote operator, it is questionable
whether the personnel on board are mainly for emergency measures, and whether they
have a leading operating position as crew and master. In the case of MASS degree 3,
the master does not onboard, so the dominance of the vessel is unclear. In other words,
there is an element in maritime commercial law that the master enables direct
occupation of the ship owner by boarding the ship as an agent of the ship owner.
However, it is argued that the status of the ship owner as a subject exercising
dominance and control over the ship becomes unclear because the master does not
board the ship (Lee et al., 2018). In addition, in MASS degree 3, the remote operator
on shore-based directly commands the ship, but it has not yet been determined whether
the ship can be regarded as a crew member and given the status of the master under
the STCW Convention (Kim, 2019). Whether it is possible to treat the MASS remote
operator as a seafarer and regulate it in accordance with international conventions and
a legal review on the qualification of operational capability are required together (Lee
et al., 2021). In this way, in a situation where MASS technology development is in
progress, it is still necessary to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the MASS
remote operator or the manufacturer of the MASS system and remote system.
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Chapter 5 MASS remote operator in the case of MASS degree
2&3
The degree of MASS 2 or 3 is a remote-controlled ship that is operated under the direct
control and instruction of a MASS remote operator on the shore. Using the remote
control system, the MASS remote operator controls the ship from a distance and has
direct control over the operation (Choi et al., 2016). In MASS degree 2, the MASS
remote operator performs the actual function, but about four to six members serve
emergency measures while on board. In MASS degree 3, the crew is not on board, so
the ship is operated entirely by the MASS remote operator (Jeon, 2022). The most
significant difference between these MASS degrees 2 and degree 3 is that when the
control of MASS is taken, degree 2 is determined by the remote operator and degree
3 is determined by the autonomous system (Strath-Korean, 2020). In other words, in
MASS degree 2, the MASS remote operator or crew aboard the MASS can be remote
or direct control at any time, and in MASS degree 3, control rights can be exchanged
when requested by the system (NFAS, 2017).

5.1 Responsibilities of MASS remote operator
In order to find out the responsibilities of the MASS remote operator, it is necessary
to take a detailed look at the work environment of the shore control system where the
MASS remote operator is located and what tasks it carries out.

5.1.1 MASS remote operating system
The MASS remote operation system consists of 1) visual control that visually monitors
the video and situation coming through CCTV, equipment and sensors; and 2) data
control that collects and analyzes data such as ship navigation information, route
information and energy efficiency analysis ("Remote control", 2019). The information
screen of the shore-based MASS remote monitoring system includes ship status
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information such as draft, displacement, trim & heeling, and stability; navigation
information indicating vessel position, route, course and speed; information of other
vessels, such as the location, course and speed of nearby vessels, and TCPA (Time to
Closest Point of Approach); sensor information such as various equipment and fire
alarms installed in the ship; low water depth, obstacle information; and event
information (Ok et al., 2020). In addition, the MASS remote operating system must
have all of autonomous control, remote control and safe control (emergency control)
modes. In autonomous control mode, MASS makes all decisions, and the remote
operating centre monitors the ship. When a dangerous situation occurs, it is converted
to remote control mode and performed accordingly. In remote control mode, it is
practicable to control all equipment including the course, speed, and direction of the
vessel. It also conducts safety control such as temperature control and fire prevention
of ships. The safe control mode performs tasks set in advance by itself in case the ship
cannot be controlled at the remote operating centre due to communication interruption,
etc. (Lee, 2018).

5.1.2 Organization of MASS remote control centre
MASS remote control centre linked organization can be functionally divided into
management, operational and support. Management operates the MASS ship, and
operational is the human resources in charge of deck, engineering, ship security,
communications, and automation belong. The support organization can be divided into
computing, security, business, technical experts, and administrative parts (Wright,
2020). The MASS remote operator controls the voyage planning or operation of the
vessel while monitoring the ship. Engineers provide system maintenance and
appropriate technical support to operators (Wright, 2020). In the MASS remote control
centre, 16 or more people are in charge of a total of 6 to 36 ships, and the operator
(helmsman) is in charge of 1 to 3 MASS depending on the navigating conditions and
characteristics in IMO degree 3, and in IMO degree 4, it is responsible for six MASS
ships in maximum (Wright, 2020). Also, Rolls-Royce announced plans to remotely
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monitor and control ships around the world by about 7 to 14 operators (Rolls-Royce,
2016).

Meanwhile, Belgian-based Seafar NV is currently operating a remote Shore Control
Centre (SCC) as a ship management company. Seafar's SCC monitors the operation
information and images received from MASS through six screens by an operator with
a master's license in three control systems that act as a bridge for the ship, and a traffic
controller at the back monitors it together (Seafar, n.d.). In addition, five program
software developers are collaborating with the MASS remote operator to improve
program functions (Seafar, n.d.).

5.1.3 Control rights and responsibilities of MASS remote operator
The MASS remote control centre generally performs the monitoring function of
MASS, but also serves the function of direct remote control in emergency situations
(EU, 2015). MASS is focused on remote control from a remote control centre on shore
in case of a problem with the MASS during standard autonomous navigation
(Burmeister et al., 2014, as cited in Lee, 2018). In other words, MASS operation
follows a pre-programmed sequence. When an unexpected event occurs, human
intervention is requested, then the MASS remote operator or the crew on the bridge
can intervene (Wright, 2020). For example, when an obstacle is detected, autonomous
control for obstacle avoidance is executed, and if there is still a problem, remote
control to manage the vessel is implemented (Lee, 2018). Conversely, in the case of
MASS degree 2, when a situation occurs where the MASS remote control centre
cannot control the MASS due to a connection communication error, the crew on board
the MASS can directly control it (SINTEF Ocean, 2021). However, the distinction
between regular duty and emergency duty is not clear. Therefore, additional discussion
is needed to establish a universal procedure on what kind of emergency situation the
MASS remote operator intervenes and controls remotely means and how to switch
control and perform in that case. Specifically, it is to establish detailed procedures for
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switching remote control rights in MASS operation situations and conditions, such as
the occurrence of a ship accident in the narrow channel, the discovery of obstacles,
and entry into the pilot area in the port (MOF, 2021). In IMO MASS degree 2, it is a
complementary system that allows not only the MASS remote operator but also the
seafarer on board the MASS to have control of the MASS, so this may be an option
for the shipowner (Choi et al., 2018b). In the case of Seafar NV, it is explained that,
while operating IMO degree 2 vessels, when they reach a zone with bridges or an area
where traffic occurs, the remote control centre takes over manual control (Seafar, n.d.).
Perhaps the key to distinguishing the roles and responsibilities of the MASS remote
operator is the transfer of control rights. Therefore, this procedure should be clearly
defined in the system process. This author claims that the responsibility of the MASS
remote operator should be limited from the time when the control rights is taken over
under the premise that all systems operate without errors and are safe in terms of cyber
security.
Meanwhile, in the case of autonomous vehicles, guidelines are presented by analyzing
scenarios in which various control rights are switched in consideration of driver,
vehicle, and environmental aspects ("How self-driving", 2021). For example, it is a
detailed procedure that informs the driver when a section needs to be driven manually
and maintains mutual communication while continuously monitoring the driver's
biometric and reaction information until the driver takes control (ETRI, 2021). In the
case of an autonomous vehicle, when the control rights is transferred from the driver
to the Automated Driving System (ADS), it proceeds stably, but on the contrary, when
the ADS requires the driver to control the manual driving, there is a risk of an accident
(ETRI, 2021). This author suggests this risk perception should be considered in the
MASS system as well.
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5.1.4 Competence of MASS remote operator
The IMO MASS Regulatory Scoping Exercise recognized that the qualifications,
responsibility, and role of the remote operator were the most complex issues to be
solved when the remote operator is designated as a seafarer (IMO, 2021a). There is no
disagreement that the MASS remote operator must have the appropriate qualifications
and experience to operate a remote monitoring system. However, if the qualification
requirements are stipulated in STCW, the MASS remote operator must first be
recognized as a seafarer. On the other hand, the IMO MASS JWG used the term
competence and requirements instead of qualification of a MASS master, crew or
responsible person, and tried to review it in a broader scope, not limited to the STCW
Convention (IMO, 2022b). In view of this, in this paragraph, this author would like to
find out the competence and requirements necessary for the MASS remote operator to
perform its work.
Since the MASS remote operator is required to have differentiated job competency
optimized for MASS and will perform the similar roles and duties as the existing
seafarers, there are many views that consider them as seafarers and complete
qualifications and training according to international standards (Jeon, 2018b, as cited
in Choi et al., 2018b) Meanwhile, it can be said that MASS operators are required to
have control, communication, control, data and program understanding in addition to
these seafarer credentials. In particular, since MASS is operated under the absolute
control of the remote operator, it is of the opinion that the operation ability of the
MASS control program will be more important than the ability of the seafarer (Choi
et al., 2018b). Therefore, there is a need to amend the training requirements as a MASS
remote operator apart from the existing seafarer training of the STCW Convention.
Belgian Seafar NV, currently operating a remote control centre equivalent to IMO
MASS degree 2, remotely controls a total of 10 ships, and is a role sharing system in
which an operator (skipper) with a master license and a traffic controller monitor
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together (Seafar, n.d). The skipper who plays the role of general operation here has a
master's certificate, but this does not mean that the skipper has the status of a master
legally. This is just a credential that objectively proves that skipper is a reliable
operator that can analyze information data collected from various sensors, CCTV,
LiDAR and radar and make appropriate judgments. The matter of hiring and operating
these people is entirely the choice of shipowners and ship management companies.
Moreover, from the shipowner's point of view, there is a tendency to prefer remote
operators with multi-capacity that can perform MASS remote control as well as
temporary measures in case of system errors (Kim, September 12, 2022). It can be said
that an overall understanding of the MASS system is essential in order to meet the
qualifications that shipowners' preference, and the training course is also thought to be
composed.
On the other hand, there are seafarers' educational institutions that are conducting
MASS remote operator training programs on their own, although it is not yet a legally
required education. The Korea Institute of Maritime and Fisheries Technology
(KIMFT) in Korea has been conducting MASS remote control training since October
2021. KIMFT's MASS remote control training is a 19-hour course for three days and
consists of MASS overview, MASS operation system, MASS remote control system,
MASS propulsion system, MASS distribution system, and MASS remote control
simulation training (KIMFT, n.d). KIMFT's education is conducted in the form of
special training for MASS researchers, shipbuilding and related industry workers who
are interested in MASS technology. It is not only currently specialized for seafarers.
In Europe, the British Royal Navy, SeaBot Xr, and United Kingdom’s National
Oceanography Centre (NOC) jointly opened a MASS training centre in 2021
("Europe's first”, 2021). Also, the University of South-Eastern Norway plans to
operate operator training for the MASS remote control centre from 2023, including
simulator familiarization and technical and legal insight (Kim, September 12, 2022).
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Regarding the qualifications of the MASS remote operator, a shore engineer optimized
for remote automatic control technology and operation program may replace the
seafarer instead of the seafarer's work area such as an existing navigator (Park, 2019).
Conversely, the administration may consider granting MASS remote operator
qualifications to system program developers and operating technicians familiar with
MASS control programs in order to secure operational workforce for MASS remote
operators, after completing specific maritime training. According to a recent study on
ship management and supervision, the essential work competencies necessary for
MASS were remote control, autonomous navigation, and ICT technology while
traditional navigational knowledge and onboard experience were found to be a low
priority (Jung et. al., 2022). This analysis suggests that, in operating MASS, familiarity
with the MASS operation system program and professional education are more critical
as qualifications for the MASS remote operator than the work capabilities of the
existing seafarer and master.
In addition, there is an opinion that the MASS remote operator should have MASS
communication and timely response ability according to the situation, and Good
Seamanship is required as well (ABS, 2021). Good Seamanship is derived from the
term "ordinary practice of seamen" mentioned in COLREG Rule 2 (a). It can be said
to be a general principle of behavior expected of seafarers (Kim, 2013, as cited in Choi
et al., 2018b). There is also a concern that overconfidence in MASS technology may
worsen the Good Seamanship and sense of responsibility previously required of
seafarers (PACST, 2019). Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to expect Good
Seamanship from the MASS remote operator. The MASS remote operator is only a
technical expert who controls and adjusts by assisting the operation of the ship, and is
not subject to the international maritime convention, which is premised on securing
human presence, such as UNCLOS, SOLAS, STCW, and COLREG (Choi et al.,
2018b). Therefore, it is also not relevant to demand Good Seamanship from nonseafarers. According to the development of technology, the mutual system of humans
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and technology will develop in a harmonious way, and technological reliability will
be evaluated as Good Seamanship (Yoo et al., 2019).

5.1.5 e-farer for MASS remote operator
Along with the development of MASS, the concept of e-farer is also being proposed.
The idea of a seafarer equipped with so-called digital literacy in line with the MASS
era is a new seafarer model with understanding capabilities such as autonomous
technology, MASS system, MASS remote control centre operation technology, remote
communication and network understanding together with monitoring techniques
necessary for MASS operation (Lee et al., 2020). In terms of expertise, the MASS
remote operator will need not only the qualifications required as a seafarer, but also
the corpus of knowledge and information & communication technology (ICT) related
skills on ship automation (Choi et al., 2018b). The future seafarer or e-farer should
have advanced work capabilities such as ship maintenance in an unmanned
environment, cargo security equipment, cyber security, port unloading automation and
remote control, and educational institutions in the maritime field must prepare a new
educational curriculum (Jo et al., 2020). As such, with the advent of MASS, the need
for education for future operators will become another challenge in the maritime field
(Kim et al., 2020).

Meanwhile, there is concern that existing seafarers' jobs will be reduced with the
advent of MASS. There is also apprehension that seafarers will face unemployment
threats when MASS is operated and the crew's workforce will be reduced (Kim et al.,
2017 as cited in Jo et al., 2020). However, establishing a new seafarer concept called
e-farer can create more jobs that can absorb existing seafarers as well as include
experts in other business areas. As a result, new business models will emerge in
shipping, shipbuilding, repair, maintenance and operation due to MASS. These
changes are expected to affect the education and training system for seafarers,
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technical engineers, shipping companies, ship management companies and
shipbuilding (Shenoi et al., 2015 as cited in Jo et al., 2020).

In the case of existing seafarers, if they work as a remote operator on shore after being
recognized for their onboard experience, they will be able to have a work-life balance
with their families while working on the shore where they can balance work and home
rather than living on an isolated ship. In addition, the MASS remote operator is
expected to open up new opportunities for female seafarers. Discrimination against
female mariners in the male-dominated ship onboarding environment still persists. In
the Republic of Korea, 39% of female students' onboard training at maritime university
is half of 80% of male students ("Onboard training", 2022), and the employment rate
of female graduates onboard is only around 10-20% ("Ministry of Gender", 2021). The
emergence of new occupations such as MASS and remote operator will be able to
contribute to the promotion of gender equality without the recognition of gender
discrimination and the practice of the maritime field that favors male seafarers. Also,
in terms of the shortage of seafarers and the aging of the population, it will help
shipowners who have difficulties in operating and hiring crews by enabling them to
manage with a minimum of human resource.

5.2 Legal status of MASS remote operator
5.2.1 MASS remote operator as a seafarer
The most acute issue regarding the legal status of the MASS remote operator is
whether the remote operator not on board a ship can be considered a seafarer. This is
because, according to STCW Convention Article III, seafarers are required to be on
board. In addition, SOLAS Convention Chapter V, Regulation 14 also states that “from
the point of view of safety of life at sea, all ships shall be sufficiently and efficiently
manned”, stipulating that boarding is essential for maintaining the safety of ships. If
MASS remote operator is regarded as a seafarer and master, it should perform the role
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of master prescribed in SOLAS and STCW Conventions, various regulations and
guidelines, but the operator of the MASS remote control centre, which has been
developed and specified so far, plays a limited role in navigation. Until now, the
definition, function, mission, and responsibility of the MASS remote operator have
been discussed through the IMO Working Group, so the legal interpretation and status
of the MASS remote operator have not yet been established.

From a functional point of view, the MASS remote operator as a decision maker
performs collision avoidance measures while remotely monitoring the ship. Therefore,
it can be judged that it plays the role of the master because it is a decision maker who
can act as a seafarer and have final command and control over the ship (Jeon, 2022).
Also, there is an opinion that such a remote operator should be regarded as a limited
master granted status and authority by limiting it to ship operation and should be
distinguished from a general master (Choi et at., 2018). In terms of the function of the
master, it is argued that the remote operator can also function as an agent of the ship
and the shipowner, since controlling the ship can be regarded as a master if it is
performed by a qualified human regardless of location (IMO, 2018e). This is argued
that the MASS remote operator can monitor ship operation, sea traffic, and weather
conditions even though the screen on land and remotely adjust the ship to maintain the
ship's safety and seaworthiness. Therefore, it can be seen as a seafarer working in a
similar place to the ship (Kim, 2019).

However, it is obvious that the MASS remote operator who does not on board the ship
is not a seafarer according to the current regulations, because it is still premised on the
STCW Convention Article III that the seafarer on boards the ship. Also, ‘on board a
ship’ means that the seafarer continues to work while affiliating with the ship’s
organization (Kwon, 2016). On the other hand, the MASS remote operator does not
meet the requirements for continuous boarding because the MASS remote operator
leaves the remote control centre after being on duty in a shift work system. In addition,
there is an opinion that the MASS remote operator is a simple engineer or employee
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who assists in the operation of a ship on land, and is equivalent to a shore employee
who works for a shipping company on the land according to the ISM regulation (Kim,
2019). Therefore, this author claims that a new definition is needed to specify the
MASS remote operator who does not meet the boarding requirements as a seafarer in
physical existence.

5.2.2 MASS remote operator as a new position
As described in paragraph 5.1.2 above, the MASS remote centre currently being
developed is not a concept where one remote operator monitors only one vessel.
According to the MUNIN project, the MASS remote centre monitors 100 ships, and
one operator is envisioned to be in charge of six MASS ships (EU, 2015). In this way,
if one operator monitors multiple MASS, it can be said that it is the same as getting on
board by being assigned roles and duties as seafarers and masters to numerous ships,
which is not appropriate from the point of safe manning view. Also, since the MASS
remote operator directly commands and controls ships at sea from land, the master's
ability to exercise independent and discretionary representation of the shipowner at
sea is no longer necessary (Choi et al., 2018b). According to this view, the MASS
remote operator is required to have a different job competency than the current master,
and therefore does not necessarily have a master certificate. Rather, due to the
difference in the form, method, and operating ability of the ship, it is sceptical of
assigning the MASS remote operator's task to the existing master, and it is more
preferable to create a new position by preparing separate certification and training
standards for the MASS remote operator effectively (Choi et al., 2018b). Also,
according to the Hague-Visby Rules Article III paragraph 3, "the carrier or the master
or agent of the carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of
lading". In other words, the master can issue a bill of lading as the carrier's
representative in terms of freight transportation, but it is difficult for the MASS remote
operator to perform this role (Jeon, 2018a). In this case, the ship's agent may play the
role, but other staff on land in the MASS operating system may also play the role.
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In this way, the MASS operating system, changes are expected as stakeholders with a
specific responsibility appear in the entire system, including remote control centres,
MASS operating program developers. In other words, like the operation of
conventional ships, the system in which the master operates as a representative of the
shipowner and is given legal responsibility in the event of a ship accident will face a
problem of unclear responsibility.

With the implementation of MASS, when the authority to operate and supervise a ship
is transferred from the ship to an onshore or other remote location, some of this
authority is delegated to the system controlling the ship. However, there is an opinion
that the ultimate responsibility rests with the operator of the MASS remote control
centre, and that MASS system software developers and manufacturers should
indirectly (Wright, 2020). This opinion has some point in terms of distributing the
responsibility of the existing master. However, it is a harsh measure to finally or
ultimately assign the responsibility and authority of the master to the MASS remote
operator just because they make the final decision on the operation of the ship on shore,
excluding those with other responsibilities.

5.2.3 MASS remote operator and data reliability
The critical criteria for the safe operation of MASS and smooth operation of the MASS
remote operating system are sensors and data above all else. Such information must
be of high quality and reliability so that MASS remote operators and systems can make
accurate decisions by providing seafarers with a physical environment equivalent to
or better than boarding a ship (Wright, 2020). This means that the stable operation
basis of the MASS remote operating system lies not in the remote operator, but rather
in the reliability of the data shared between the MASS ship and the MASS remote
operating system and in the communication system that stably delivers it.
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For the smooth operation of MASS, confidence in "systems, data and decisionmaking" is required ("MAS technology moving", 2022), but systems and data may
have errors in interpretation and may lead to incomplete judgment. The MASS remote
operator is in a passive position to fully trust and blindly accept the information
displayed by the system (Kim et al., 2020). Moreover, the amount of information
displayed in the MASS remote centre and one operator's supervision can cause
problems in situational awareness and decision-making and ultimately threaten the
reliability of the MASS (Kim et al., 2020). In the case of MASS degree 3, when an
accident occurs, responsibility can be imposed on the MASS remote operator, ship
operation manager, ship control system, system developer, shipowner, etc. (Chun et
al., 2021). If the cause of the accident is a malfunction in the navigation, cargo
measurement, or communication equipment of the MASS, the MASS remote operator
fails to make a correct decision, and there is a problem of who is responsible. In this
case, the equipment manufacturer or the maintenance company in case of inadequate
repair or maintenance will have to be held responsible. If a problematic sensor is
identified in advance and neglected without repair, the responsibility lies with the
shipowner or ship operator. As such, the MASS remote operator, who makes
judgments with only limited navigation information remotely on land, is constantly
exposed to such errors. In addition, as there is a limitation in not being able to judge
directly by looking at the sea, weather, and ship traffic conditions like the conventional
master, the responsibility for the MASS remote operator should be limited, and an
international consensus on the limitation and distribution of responsibility must be
reached before MASS operation.

Meanwhile, in the matter of civil liability in the event of an accident, the subject of
management responsibility may be raised depending on who manages and supervises
the MASS remote operator. If the shipowner directly hires and uses the MASS remote
operator, the shipowner will be the subject of management responsibility, so the user
will be held responsible for the intention or negligence of the MASS remote operator
(Kim, 2020). If the employer is a shore-based MASS operating company or a ship
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management company, the management company may be held liable and the
shipowner may be exempted (Kim, 2020).

5.3 Case analysis of autonomous vehicles
An autonomous vehicle refers to a vehicle that autonomously drives to a destination
by controlling the vehicle by judging the driving situation and surrounding
environment while excluding driver intervention (An et al., 2013). Research related to
autonomous vehicles is relatively advanced compared to MASS. Therefore, the case
of autonomous vehicles can be referred to in the development of MASS technology
and legal issues.

5.3.1 Level of autonomy of autonomous vehicles
The U.S. Department of Transportation has approved level 6 of autonomous vehicles
classified by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) (“The 6 Levels”, n.d.). Level
0 is the level always operated manually by the driver. Level 1 and level 2 is a partially
automatic levels with functions such as departure warning and steering and
acceleration, etc. Level 3 is a conditional automation level where most automatic
driving is possible but requires human override. Level 4 is high automation and level
5 is full of automation. It can be considered fully autonomous driving from level 4. It
is noteworthy that even at level 4 and level 5, the driver can select a manual operation
mode. This is a balanced system that does not exclude monitoring and control from
the reciprocal systems in which humans and machines complement each other (Lee,
et al., 2021).

5.3.2 Responsibility for autonomous vehicle accidents
From level 3, where autonomous driving is possible in a specific section, the
identification of responsibility for accidents becomes more complicated. This is due
to the decentralization of the vehicle's driving responsibilities. The higher the level of
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autonomous driving, the greater the responsibility of the product. In an autonomous
driving accident from level 2 to level 4, the autonomous driving system's operational
dominance increases, and a significant part of the causes of accidents are caused by
system failures or defects, which significantly increases the responsibility of the
manufacturer and lowers the responsibility of the driver (Kim, 2021). However, the
cause and responsibility for the accident may become unclear.

To solve this problem, Germany made it mandatory to install a black box that records
data logs in autonomous vehicles ("Self-driving cars", 2022). The Republic of Korea
also mandates that a data storage system for automated driving (DSSAD) be installed
in autonomous vehicles according to Article 39-17 of the Automobile Accident
Compensation Security Law. The DSSAD records and stores the operation and release
of the autonomous driving system, driving change request, driver input, start and end
of emergency operation, detection of imminent collision risk, the timing of recording
driving information, and recognition of collision (“Safety standards”, 2020). The
device can determine whether the driver is a human or an autonomous driving system
at the time of an accident, and as a result of the accident investigation, it can be a basis
for determining whether the automaker is responsible if there is a problem with the
system.

Meanwhile, in some cases, liability in the event of an autonomous vehicle accident is
defined as a shared responsibility. According to the 'Ethical Guidelines for SelfDriving Vehicles' distributed by The Republic of Korea in 2020, autonomous vehicles
cannot be held responsible for themselves because they are objects, and designers,
manufacturers, service providers and users are the subject of responsibility (MOLIT,
2020). In other words, in the event of an accident, the responsibility is not only on one
side, but is shared as a joint entity.
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5.3.3 Autonomous Vehicle Accident Investigation Committee
In the case of an autonomous vehicle accident, there are several responsible parties, so
a Committee and an expert who can objectively judge it are needed. The Republic of
Korea requires the establishment of an autonomous vehicle accident investigation
Committee in accordance with Chapter 6-3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation
Security Law. In the event of an accident, the Committee conducts an accident site
investigation with experts, analyzes the DSSAD installed in the vehicle, and
investigates the parties involved in the accident, such as the vehicle owner, driver,
victim, and automobile manufacturer. If a defect in the vehicle is confirmed as a result
of the investigation, the driver (the driver's insurance company) can claim the damage
amount from the manufacturer.

5.4 Opinions of experts in the maritime field
There is no consensus on granting MASS remote operators the qualifications of master
(or seafarer) and legal status and responsibilities. Rather, the opinions of governments,
shipowners, ship management companies, seafarer education institutions, and research
institutions of each country differ from each other. Therefore, it is expected that there
will be difficulties in enacting the IMO regulations including the new MASS code in
the future. Concretely, opinions may differ between shipowner-friendly countries and
seafarers-friendly countries. From a shipowner's point of view, while there are
advantages of being able to broaden the scope of ship operation efficiency, cost
reduction, and crew recruitment, there may be concerns that safety cannot be
guaranteed. The position of the seafarer education institution is considered to have the
opinion that the MASS remote operator must also have a seafarer's certificate in order
to foster seafarers and protect the employment of seafarers. A country that has MASS
and MASS remote control technology will not prefer to regulate the qualification of
MASS remote operator as a seafarer for MASS technology and future market
preoccupation. From this point of view, it is valuable to collect the opinions of experts
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in the maritime field and reference them in future MASS Code works and individual
national policy establishment and implementation.

An expert at a maritime university claims that the MASS remote operator should also
complete the MASS operator training after acquiring the seafarer qualifications
required by the STCW Convention. The relevant training regulations could be added
to the special training requirements of STCW Code A-V. A professor who studies
MASS remote operating system argues that because MASS remote control is more
difficult to control than a conventional ship, it is necessary to possess a seafarer
qualification as well as advanced expertise and skill. For the same reason, he stresses
that it is difficult for a person without a seafarer qualification to become a MASS
remote operator with basic ship navigation training. An official at the Shipowners'
association delivers an opinion that even without a seafarer's license, a person could
qualify as a MASS remote operator if the person received a year or so of navigational
training. A professor who studies the risk analysis and evaluation of MASS claims that
it is difficult to give MASS remote operators the same responsibilities and duties as
conventional masters, considering the risk of becoming out of control due to
communication errors or other causes in the MASS system. He also argues that even
after the appearance of MASS, considering that conventional ships and MASS are
mixed in the sea area, for the time being, MASS remote operator also needs seafarer
qualifications.
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Chapter 6 Suggestions and Conclusion
6.1 Suggestions
6.1.1 Defining of the MASS remote operator
As this author mentioned in Chapter 5.2.1 above, a definition is needed to specify the
MASS remote operator. In other words, it is necessary to establish a new position as a
“master for MASS remote operator” that can accommodate the role of the MASS
remote operator and distinguish it from the current master (Choi et al., 2018).
Accepting this argument, it could be the best way to prepare as a human factor to take
new MASS technology while maintaining the existing crew qualification and training
system in STCW Convention without any confusion. Accordingly, this author
proposes that the master for MASS remote operator can be newly defined in the STCW
Convention and MASS Code as follows:

Definition:
MASS remote operator is a person who monitors the MASS operation status based on
operational information received from the shore-based remote system and MASS and
directly participates in the system when necessary, such as in an emergency, to give
appropriate commands or control.

This definition is premised on the MASS remote operator monitoring the safe
operation of the MASS under the normal operation of the system. In addition, it
implies performing control rights while communicating with the system when
necessary.

The MASS remote operator performs by referring to the navigation watch stipulated
in the STCW Code, and the responsibilities and roles for this should be clearly
identified in the relationship of the MASS operating system.
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This definition takes into account that the duties of the MASS remote operator may be
performed in accordance with the STCW Code, but shall be performed under the
characteristics of each manufacturer's MASS operating system.

6.1.2 Establishing guidelines for the job description of the MASS operating
system
As the technology and automation degree of MASS increases, the responsibility
becomes unclear. However, in other words, it is reasonable to view that responsibility
is distributed among each element in the MASS system. To clearly identify MASS
operations and their responsibilities in the event of an accident, it is necessary to define
in the guidelines the work and responsibility of all stakeholders, including
manufacturers, system programmers, system operators, and MASS remote operators,
involved in the operation of the system at each stage of automation. The original work
of the existing master could be done by other departments or staff in the field job. For
example, confirmation of cargo loading status and establishment of voyage plan will
not be confirmed by the MASS remote operator but may be processed by AI programs,
other personnel of the system, or other shore-based support departments.

Therefore, this author proposes a direction of the guideline for the division of work
based on the research made in this study as follows:

A guideline of the job description for the personnel of MASS operating system:

For MASS operation, shipowner, ship management company, MASS remote control
centre, MASS remote operator, MASS system program manager, MASS system
communication facility manager, MASS system maintenance company, cargo handling
and transportation contract manager, other accident handling and emergency
response organizations in relation to each task and responsibility, it should be
specified to be observed by referring to the following.
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Responsibilities and roles for the overall operation of the MASS operating system
should be clearly divided in the division of duties, and the responsibilities and roles of
the master for MASS should be appropriately distributed between the MASS operating
system and its stakeholders. In addition, the situation of switching MASS operation
control rights between the MASS remote control centre and MASS should be specified
in detail.

The suggestion of the above guideline regulation reflects the author's argument that
the MASS remote operator cannot be entirely held accountable as the master. The
responsibilities of the existing master should be thoroughly and clearly divided within
the MASS system. This means that detailed job descriptions including MASS control
rights for the MASS system should be prepared and documented as effective
regulations.

6.1.3 Establishment of MASS Code
It is necessary to define the MASS remote operator as a performance assistant or
employee of the ship owner or carrier, not the master or crew, in the MASS Code
discussed through the IMO Working Group. In addition, the MASS code should
include the MASS remote operator's duties and responsibilities in detail for each
situation, if possible. In addition, the Code should consist of a general basis that can
provide the standard division of duties guideline for the MASS operating system,
urging interested parties to utilize and cooperate. Based on the MASS Code, each
administration may check the competent MASS for safe and proper navigation and
assign the responsibility to exercise its jurisdiction, such as issuing certificates.

6.1.4 MASS remote operator training system and competence establishment
As another implementing method, the STCW amendment is to define the so-called efarer, including the MASS remote operator in the STCW Convention, and to establish
competence requirements, education and training systems according to the MASS
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operating system. In addition, the IMO and each flag State should consider adjusting
the minimum safe manning requirements or enacting special manning requirements to
allow MASS to operate. This will enable shipowners to have a wider choice of
employing a person with a master or navigator competence as the chief remote
operator and a person without a seafarer competence but with an e-farer competence
as a regular remote operator.

Competence requirements for e-farer including MASS remote operator:
The e-farer must meet the eligibility requirements set out below and be able to do the
job.

1. Must be able to handle the MASS operating system and its operating program.
2. Must be able to execute control, communication and emergency response
procedures in accordance with the MASS operating program.
3. Must understand the basic navigation skills and cargo handling methods required
for MASS operation, and be able to identify program errors.
4. Must understand MASS operation watch procedures, maintenance, handover
procedures, and other information and procedures necessary for operation including
emergency response.

As discussed in Chapter 5.1.4 "Competence of MASS remote operator", MASS remote
operator requires the ability to understand MASS operating system separately from
existing seafarer training. Accordingly, this author proposes the curriculum content for
the concept of e-farer including MASS remote operator as described above.

6.1.5 Legal liability protection of MASS remote operator
In terms of MASS operation, in MASS degrees 2 & 3, the remote operator performs
the role of remotely controlling the MASS, so it can be said that it plays the role of a
crew member or master of a conventionally manned ship. However, it is reasonable to
think that the MASS remote operator acts as one of several functional elements of the
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MASS navigation system. When granting the master's responsibility and authority to
the MASS remote operator, this should be limited and specific legal protective
measures are also required. This is because the MASS remote operator is not in a
position to judge the operation while directly reboarding the ship like the existing
master. However, even if the technology of the MASS ship is realized with automation
and remote-control communication technology, it will be difficult to completely
control the MASS on land in a sudden and changeable situation such as the
deterioration of the weather at sea. Since the MASS system is equipped with a collision
avoidance program, collisions can be prevented in advance, but not all vessel collisions
can be prevented because unpredictable situations at sea always exist (Kim, 2020).
Therefore, the MASS remote operator cannot be given complete responsibility and
authority like the existing master, and legal liability is limited and protective devices
are required. As a legal and institutional safeguard, the administration certification
procedure for the MASS operating system may be introduced. In other words, it is a
conformity test for the MASS operating system, cargo loading program, cargo gauge
and ship sensor equipment, and type approval procedure. Through this, the reliability
and safety of the MASS operating system and program can be verified, and the
responsibility of the MASS remote operator can be protected.

6.1.6 MASS operation area setting
At the national level, it may be considered to establish, announce, and operate a route
dedicated to MASS. Currently, according to the existing IMO and national regulations,
it is impossible for a seafarer to operate a vessel, not on board. Therefore, China,
Singapore, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries have designated and operated
special test areas for MASS operation (Wright, 2020). However, this is a temporary
measure for testing and operation in a restricted area, and in order to operate the actual
MASS into the route, it is necessary to designate a special route that is different from
the conventional ship and also to identify it on the port vessel traffic services (VTS)
control system. Also, there is a case in which regulation barriers have been relaxed by
coordinating crew requirements in cooperation with relevant authorities to operate
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MASS remote control centre and MASS degree 2 vessels, such as Flemish
Government and Flemish Waterway authorities in Belgium (Nzengu et al., 2021;
SINCEEF, 2021).

In addition, the propulsion engine of MASS is expected to use a battery-powered
electric propulsion system, which is suitable for ships such as short-sea route shipping
and ferries (Wright, 2020). This is because the electric propulsion method is much
more effective in monitoring and controlling the maintenance and propulsion system
status on shore in the offshore environment without a seafarer (PACST, 2019).
Therefore, in terms of the operation area of the ship, the type of MASS is likely to be
a ferry, a tug, or a coastal vessel operating in a restricted area (Vojković et al., 2020).
In other studies, it is argued that feeder vessels engaged in short-distance coastal
voyages rather than oceangoing vessels are suitable as business models for MASS
operations (Fonseca et al., 2021). If so, it may be possible to consider operating a route
permit system that sets and announces short-distance routes exclusively for MASS
according to the operational environment of MASS for each country.

At the IMO level, by including MASS routes in Ships' routeing, it will be possible to
announce internationally and activate operations. In order to establish a route
dedicated to MASS, each country's government should evaluate the risks and safety
necessary for route opening in advance and secure sufficient safety. If a pre-MASS
route certified by the administration is established, MASS operation and the safety of
the route can be guaranteed together. In other words, since it is a MASS that operates
on a set route like a train running on a track, the predictability will be high and prompt
emergency response will be possible in case of errors due to internal causes or external
variables.

The method of setting the MASS-only route can be established through the
certification process according to the situation of each country. For example, a MASS
management company applies for the establishment of a MASS route to the
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administration together with a MASS system developer, a master with experience in
route operation, and the MASS operation department. The application should include
the MASS operating system manual and division of duties for the MASS remote
control centre. The administration that has received the application for the MASS route
certification judges the safety and technical compatibility of the route according to the
standards, and if there is no problem, it certifies and issues a certificate. The planned
route certified by the administration is entered into the MASS operation system and
the system processes the arrival/departure verification, cargo verification and safe
operation requirements as a program.

6.1.7 Establishment and operation of the MASS accident investigation
Committee
The IMO recommends setting up an 'Autonomous Vessel Accident Investigation
Committee' that investigates who is responsible for MASS accidents, such as the
autonomous vehicle accident investigation committee. To this end, the existing IMO
Casualty Investigation Code (Code of the International Standards and Recommended
Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident) should
be revised to support the formation of similar organizations. The government of each
IMO member state should take national legislative measures to assign duties and roles
to the Maritime Casualty Tribunal or similar organization under the government.

6.1.8 MASS operation system evaluation system operation
For the smooth operation of MASS, evaluation of the MASS system including ships
should be performed periodically. If the evaluation is passed, a certificate is issued so
that it can be maintained and managed. MASS system evaluation items include actual
operation evaluation items such as simulation and ship test operations conducted
according to the MASS operation evaluation scenario in which the operational
conditions of MASS, maritime traffic and weather conditions are considered in
advance. The MASS remote operator is not in a position to take responsibility for an
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overall MASS operation like the existing master of the ship. Therefore, it is
unreasonable and inappropriate to give the MASS remote operator the duty of master.

6.2 Conclusions
MASS is another type of maritime mobile operated by an automated system, although
it has the form of a ship. Therefore, the MASS remote operator cannot have the status
and responsibility of a seafarer or master intact. The MASS remote operator is only a
human element that performs operational functions on the basis of a given system
environment. The MASS remote operator does not physically board the ship like the
existing master, and is not in a position to assume responsibility and role in the overall
MASS operation. Therefore, it is unreasonable and inappropriate to give the MASS
remote operator the duty of master.

Qualifying MASS remote operators as seafarer should also be considered carefully.
The final level of MASS is the IMO degree 4 fully autonomous system, which is
achieved step by step through the development of system technology. If it consistently
looks at the development stages of these MASS systems, it should be recognized that
the autonomous navigation system is a part of the development stage of the system. In
this stage of the MASS system, the shore remote operator plays a role as a subordinate
part of the system. That is, the remote operator of MASS is a functional element of the
MASS system and acts as a different element from the conventional ship on which
crew members are aboard. In other words, the MASS remote operator is different from
the master and crew, who are given independent responsibility and authority on a
traditional ship, and should be viewed as a system operator performing special tasks.
After all, the task given to the MASS operator is systemic and must be clearly defined
in the system operating manual. That is, the MASS operator performs the function
according to the operating manual, and consequently, the responsibility is limited.
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MASS has different structural characteristics of the ship and there is no crew on board.
Therefore, there is a limit to applying the current SOLAS and STCW regulations. So
far, IMO has made efforts to identify the existing IMO international standards through
RSE, apply them to MASS, and interpret them. However, these efforts tend to raise
the problem of new interpretations and add to the confusion. The international
community and interested parties should be cautious about granting the master's status
to the MASS remote operator in enacting the new MASS Code. The master of a ship
is not just a person who controls the ship, but a person in charge of the ship with strict
public legal and judicial responsibilities. Therefore, more consideration should be
given to how to effectively distribute the roles and responsibilities of the existing
master in the MASS system. In other words, rather than regulating the new technology
of MASS, it is necessary to find a solution on how to embrace it as a system while
maintaining the safety and economic efficiency of MASS.

MASS is expected to further improve safety by reducing human error in technical
applications such as enhanced monitoring and detection technology, collision
avoidance and accident prevention functions compared to conventional ships.
However, in order to realize this, it is necessary to prepare a legal framework and
system that grants the MASS remote operator reasonable authority and duty.

In conclusion, in order to enable MASS operation in the future, it is necessary to agree
on the responsibilities and status of the MASS remote operator, MASS system, and
MASS technology in the international community. To that end, the IMO and each flag
State government must ensure that MASS technology is implemented through
reasonable regulations and that laws are enacted to benefit future shipping. In addition,
all stakeholders in the international maritime field should continuously seek mutual
cooperation and efforts to create a solution that can solve the problems expected along
with the development of MASS technology.
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